The Role of Foreign Policy in the 2024 U.S. Presidential Election

I wrote another paper.

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The Fletcher Forum on World Affairs just released their Summer 2024 issue. The theme is timely enough: “Polls to Policy: Elections, Democracies, and International Relations.” It includes an interview with homeland security expert Juliette Kayyem on stochastic terrorism in the United States, another with Paul Staniland and Milan Vaishnav on the recent Indian elections, and Amelia Hadfield & Mustafa Demir on the populist right’s challenge to European parliamentary elections.

Oh, and I have a short paper in there as well! It’s entitled, “Will Foreign Policy Matter in the 2024 U.S. Elections?” My skeet-length answer? “not much.”

My slightly longer answer? Here’s the paper abstract:

In recent decades, foreign policy has played a minor role in U.S. presidential elections, especially compared to more trenchant issues like the economy. Will 2024 be any different? The closeness of the race means any little factor could play a role—but it remains highly unlikely. Polling continues to show that the public does not place a high priority on foreign policy. Even high salience issues, like the war in Gaza, motivate fewer voters than is commonly believed. The most likely effect is a modest hit to Kamala Harris’ support, as the incumbent party will shoulder the blame for perceptions that the world is falling apart. The scale of these effects will nevertheless be minor.

Longtime readers of Drezner’s World should not be surprised by these conclusions. I have long been on record bemoaning the small role that foreign policy plays in any U.S. presidential election despite the outsized role that the president plays in orchestrating American foreign policy. And as I noted in the essay, that disinterest has not changed despite some dramatic shifts in world politics:

Even as the liberal international order has eroded over the past decade, American voters have evinced less interest in foreign affairs. The aftereffects of the pandemic continue to linger, leading most Americans to turn inward rather than devote much attention to international politics. The Pew Research Center concluded in April 2024 that, “Americans are even less likely to prioritize international affairs than they were in 2019.” Public opinion polling shows that Americans are pessimistic about the current and future state of the country, perceptions that are far more likely to affect voting decisions than international relations disputes. Such sentiments reinforce the pre-existing “rational ignorance” that American voters display towards foreign affairs—thereby minimizing the influence of foreign policy on voting decisions.

One could argue that with such a close election, even the small numbers of voters who care about world politics can make a difference. That is particularly true given the high profile that the wider turmoil in the Middle East has attracted in newspapers and on college campuses.

Neither proposition holds. If the folks who cared about foreign policy voted as a monolithic bloc it could matter. The thing is, though…

Given the small margin separating the major party candidates, even a single percentage point could decide the outcome. But this presumes that the voters who prioritize international relations as a voting issue possess homogenous foreign policy preferences that align closely with either Trump or Harris. There is no evidence to suggest that this is true. Polling of Americans on high-profile foreign policy questions, such as aid to Ukraine, is inevitably split along partisan lines. Polarization reduces any chances that one candidate would benefit from focusing on foreign policy as a campaign issue.

Gaza should be a tough test for whether foreign policy will matter in the election, given the news it has generated for much of 2024. And yet the polling data shows it is not that tough of a test at all:

There are reasons to doubt that the war in Gaza will prove pivotal for the 2024 election. All of the available polling evidence to date suggests that the conflict is not top of mind for most voters. In Gallup’s March 2024 survey, for example, just 2 percent of the respondents said that war in the Middle East was the most important problem for the United States. Polling further shows that it is not a high priority for young voters either. In a Harvard Institute of Politics survey of voters under the age of thirty, only 2 percent said that Israel/Palestine was their biggest concern. Compared to other issues listed, the conflict in Gaza ranked 15th out of sixteen listed issues. A Generation Lab poll of college students taken after the protests made front-page news revealed a similar finding—they ranked the Middle East conflict as the least important issue out of nine options.

You’ll have to read the whole thing to see the rest of the argument.

One last note. The Fletcher Forum asked me to write this paper back in late April. My rough draft was completed in early May. Readers may be vaguely aware that there were some important developments in the world and in the 2024 campaign that have transpired since then. Those events required major surgery a few minor edits. So I am grateful to the Fletcher Forum’s editorial staff — particularly Sitara Srinivas, who also served as my summer research assistant — for their assistance during the drafting of this paper.

Enjoy!