Where Trump's National Security Strategy is Right

Yes, there are a few points of agreement.

Photo by Tomasz Zielonka on Unsplash

The hard-working staff here at Drezner’s World has made little secret of its disdain for the Trump administration’s foreign policy. That includes its recently released National Security Strategy, a document that is way, way too obsessed with Europe’s domestic politics.

In the spirit of open-mindedness and intellectual curiosity, however, I re-read the NSS to see if there were any instances in which I agreed with the document. And I was surprised to find at least a few areas where I found myself nodding along.

So where are the areas of agreement? Well, for one thing, this is an actual strategy. The 2025 NSS is extremely clear about what it is prioritizing — hegemony within the Western hemisphere, restricting mass migration, burden-shifting to allies, and prioritizing economic security. As the 2025 NSS explains:

A strategy must evaluate, sort, and prioritize. Not every country, region, issue, or cause—however worthy—can be the focus of American strategy. The purpose of foreign policy is the protection of core national interests; that is the sole focus of this strategy.

American strategies since the end of the Cold War have fallen short—they have been laundry lists of wishes or desired end states; have not clearly defined what we want but instead stated vague platitudes; and have often misjudged what we should want….

It has become customary for documents such as this to mention every part of the world and issue, on the assumption that any oversight signifies a blind spot or a snub. As a result, such documents become bloated and unfocused—the opposite of what a strategy should be.

To focus and prioritize is to choose—to acknowledge that not everything matters equally, to everyone. It is not to assert that any peoples, regions, or countries are somehow intrinsically unimportant. The United States is by every measure the most generous nation in history—yet we cannot afford to be equally attentive to every region and every problem in the world.

The purpose of national security policy is the protection of core national interests—some priorities transcend regional confines. For instance, terrorist activity in an otherwise less consequential area might force our urgent attention. But leaping from that necessity to sustained attention to the periphery is a mistake.

A few stray clauses aside, I agree with this meta-sentiment.

Indeed, I not only agree, I wrote about this very problem last year in Foreign Affairs: “How Everything Became National Security And National Security Became Everything.” The key paragraphs:

The foreign policy establishment [adds] new things to the realm of national security without getting rid of old ones. Problems in world politics rarely die; at best, they tend to ebb very slowly. Newer crises command urgent attention. Issues on the back burner, if not addressed, inevitably migrate to the top of the queue. Policy entrepreneurs across the political spectrum want the administration, members of Congress, and other shapers of U.S. foreign policy to label their issue a national security priority, in the hope of gaining more attention and resources….

But if everything is defined as national security, nothing is a national security priority. Without a more considered discussion among policymakers about what is and what is not a matter of national security, Washington risks spreading its resources too thin across too broad an array of issues. This increases the likelihood of missing a genuine threat to the safety and security of the United States. Whoever is sworn in as president next January will need to think about first principles in order to rightsize the definition of national security. Otherwise, policymakers risk falling into a pattern of trying to do everything, ensuring that they will do nothing well.

I vehemently disagree with the Trump administration’s priorities, but I can’t deny that they have actually set priorities. The 2025 NSS is a lot of things, but it ain’t a laundry list.

Second, the NSS correctly notes the strategic value of a U.S. partnership with India. From the NSS:

We must continue to improve commercial (and other) relations with India to encourage New Delhi to contribute to Indo-Pacific security, including through continued quadrilateral cooperation with Australia, Japan, and the United States (“the Quad”)….

America should similarly enlist our European and Asian allies and partners, including India, to cement and improve our joint positions in the Western Hemisphere and, with regard to critical minerals, in Africa….

A related security challenge is the potential for any competitor to control the South China Sea. This could allow a potentially hostile power to impose a toll system over one of the world’s most vital lanes of commerce or—worse—to close and reopen it at will. Either of those two outcomes would be harmful to the U.S. economy and broader U.S. interests. Strong measures must be developed along with the deterrence necessary to keep those lanes open, free of “tolls,” and not subject to arbitrary closure by one country. This will require not just further investment in our military—especially naval—capabilities, but also strong cooperation with every nation that stands to suffer, from India to Japan and beyond, if this problem is not addressed.

The absence of any criticism of India in the NSS is something of a surprise given the way the Trump administration has actually treated India during this term. Perhaps this says something about whether the NSS will provide any real sway over Trump’s foreign policy. Still, at least it is in the text!

Third, I was pleasantly surprised to see a Trump administration national security strategy speak positively about soft power — even though the drafters of the NSS do not exactly understand the concept:

We want to maintain the United States’ unrivaled “soft power” through which we exercise positive influence throughout the world that furthers our interests. In doing so, we will be unapologetic about our country’s past and present while respectful of other countries’ differing religions, cultures, and governing systems. “Soft power” that serves America’s true national interest is effective only if we believe in our country’s inherent greatness and decency.

Soft power is not about being unapologetic — it’s about others admiring American values, policy competency, and cultural attractiveness without alienating allies and partners. This is certainly something that Joe Nye — the international relations scholar who coined the term — commented upon early in Trump’s second term. Council on Foreign Relations president Michael Froman noted the cognitive dissonance on this point as well:

It’s worth taking stock of how the strategy contradicts some administration actions taken over the past year. Consider the stated need for the United States to have “unrivaled soft power.” Yet, the administration has dramatically reduced foreign development assistance and shuttered the operations of the long-time broadcaster Voice of America without really standing up alternative means of exercising soft power.

There is one final section of the 2025 NSS that I agree with wholeheartedly: there must be accountability for those who abuse American power:

The purpose of the American government is to secure the God-given natural rights of American citizens. To this end, departments and agencies of the United States Government have been granted fearsome powers. Those powers must never be abused, whether under the guise of “deradicalization,” “protecting our democracy,” or any other pretext. When and where those powers are abused, abusers must be held accountable.

I have no doubt that the drafters of this NSS were thinking about the likes of James Comey or Joe Biden when they drafted this section. Make no mistake, however, the myriad abuses committed by Trump and his policy principals are being documented. And the hard-working staff here at Drezner’s World will work even harder if it leads to Trump and his sycophants being held accountable.