FWIW, the link doesn't work. I get an error message saying "The page isn’t redirecting properly" (in Firefox) and "This page isn’t working right now /www.worldpoliticsreview.com redirected you too many times" (DuckDuckGo).
I will be ready to consider your thesis when I am convinced of this: "U.S. hegemony looks wobbly". I believe we remain our own worst enemy for the moment. Our economy is doing much better than any other great power, our military remains potent and our alliances more robust than any peer competitor.
My candidates for a great, or near great power war are China India and Russia. They can get in each other's shorts via land vis water. The Russia Ukraine War shows a land battle does not necessarily lead to a nuclear exchange. If one of the three wants to smack the US, they have to launch a missile which must be assumed to be nuclear. China is re-evaluating Taiwan in the light of Ukraine.
I highly recommend Jim Sciutto’s book The Return of the Great Powers since you clearly seem to know where the threat lies. Its highly illuminating. I’m listening to the audiobook compliments of Libby.
Great piece. I'm deeply worried about the idea that "fear of a great power war could lead to one."
I'm a big Noah Smith fan, and he has me largely convinced about the strategic need for rebuilding America's industrial capacity because of concerns about China. At the same time, I definitely worry that his framing of the problem could lead to an arms race that will make war more likely.
And while I was happy about the fact that in one of his recent pieces (https://www.noahpinion.blog/p/tiktok-is-just-the-beginning), he makes the point that when talking about our concerns about China, we should always try to balance it by expressing our respect for Chinese culture and China's accomplishments, as well as differentiate between the regime's leadership and its people; at the same time, I didn't think that's enough.
It would be an insane for both countries if China and the U.S. ever stumbled into war. The interests of both countries simply don't diverge enough for that to ever make sense. But it's easy to imagine scenarios of how that could happen, especially in a situation where America is rebuilding its military arsenal explicitly to prepare for a battle with China, and China believes it has to act fast, before this build-up happens, if it is ever to reunify Taiwan with the mainland.
What I think the world needs is for a Jean Monnet figure to emerge. Someone who understands how destructive war is and also understands that building the right relationships between countries can help prevent that from happening.
The NYT link says China's critical minerals embargo was in response to Biden's December semiconductor sanctions. Sounds like an implied offer to Trump to make a deal? An opportunity to wet his beak. I believe Trump will avoid war with China because he's basically a coward/bully. The kids are more his preferred size around the "Gulf of America" (Mexico erasure, get it?)
Thanks for crafting this thoughtful and thought-provoking piece on WPR. Some thoughts, not sure if we have the time or space for such discussions.
First, what's the timeline? From the article, are you saying that hot wars are likely happen during the second Trump presidency, or that, absent of course-correction, a war is likely in the future given the increased economic actions in service of geopolitical objectives?
We are clear who the "Great Powers" are: US and allies, China and, to a more diminished extent, Russia. What compels any of these actors to start a hot war?
Russian revanchism is ideologically-driven, but is there not also a heavy dose of pragmatism? The 2022 war, one can argue, is motivated — or rather not inhibited — by the relatively successful 2014 campaign. Would Russian invasion have taken a different form had Western Europe or even Ukrainian resistance been greater during the 2014? Had economic sanctions against Russian after Crimean annexation been greater and more sustained by the EU, say? By this reading, Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 will deter or delay further Russian extraterritorial ambitions because of the military and economic costs. (Counterfactuals are difficult to prove, but nonetheless, I am interested in any thoughts here.)
Then there's the Chinese. I don't know to what extent you subscribe to the idea that PRC has extraterritorial ambitions besides Taiwan and South China Sea, or that PRC leadership's worldview in "East is rising" encompasses more than a revisionistic rebuke to US-led economic and geopolitical order by providing a legitimate alternative to, say, the Global South. Lately, more and more punditry and messages from political establishments have interpreted the PRC mandate as displacing US primacy with a Sinocentric world order. I disagree, in part because, well, of my own bias (as a China "dove") but also from the lack of evidence beyond cherry-picked passages from CCP plenums.
Nonetheless, I would be convinced by a clear-eyed right-sized analysis of Chinese irridentism or martial tendencies. The frequently quoted examples of Chinese gray zone tactics seem threatening but what part of these tactics are 1) reactionary and defense-orientated (and therefore, there is room for foreign policy and diplomatic agency in steering the path away from conflict) 2) preparing for civil-military contingency (and does not warrant political escalation) and 3) provocations to push the boundaries of our norms and order — the salami slicing — (in which case we must react with strict boundaries and reaffirm these boundaries with measured consequences and off-ramps). None of (1), (2) or (3) frame the current US-China tension as the inevitable march towards Thucydides trap. Of course, there's (4) Xi really wants to destroy the US because he hates our freedom. I feel like we heard that one before, some time in the early 2000s.
Maybe greater sanctions that kneecaps Chinese growth can overcome the long-standing tradition of 有理，有利，有节 (righteous, advantageous, measured) or the trend that Chinese assertiveness is negatively correlated with domestic strength. I don't know, and I am suspicious of anyone's claim based on word of mouth alone. #notaccpspy
Moreover, do we have evidence that the Chinese political (and less so business) elites have any appetite for hot wars with US-led coalition? Are these elites in positions of influence? Are we just thinking about Xi, and to what extent he alone can overcome decades (perhaps millenia) of fractured authoritarianism to mobilize in the timeline in question?
Finally, there's the US sudden turn towards expansionism. Who knew we had it in us (anymore)? There is some evidence of our appetite for war, at least with China. Per Pew studies in 2023, around half of Americans are favorable of war with China over Taiwan (in the event of conflict over proclamation of Taiwanese independence); 42% of Americans view the PRC as an enemy nation (as opposed to competitor nation). However, I question whether these numbers accurately reflect our actual appetite for war, given 1) evaluation of war's justifications does not equate to level of wartime support and 2) very few Americans actually went to fight in Ukraine and a growing level of Americans are pushing for a ceasefire — which will inform our near future views of conflicts in general and 3) we have not fought a near peer or a peer military power for a long while, and the economic and political cost, while not immediately imaginable, can quickly become apparent in the period leading up to that war. That is not to say we don't want to fight the Chinese, and maybe that is enough to chip away at your fourth pillar; we are already pushing enough of them — and those who "look like" them — onto the subway tracks.
Still, I question to what extent are these trends shaping a consensus in Washington, and, if not and without a consensus, is it enough for trade wars and countermeasures to compel US public and governing elites to push for war with Panama, Denmark or China. Why would elites take the tremendous political and economic risk of mobilization if they can avoid it, especially (if what I said about China is correct) with significant forewarning and foresight?
There is a tendency to transpose prewar Europe onto the present geopolitical post-post-Cold War actors. Because the elite actors kept diaries and memoirs, and receipts and documents. Galore. Obviously there is tremendous wealth there from which modern IR drew and continue to draw. However, my impulse is always to question parallels to any situation from this time period, however apt, and ask "how can this idea be wrong"? Unlike Allison's Thucydides Trap, your ideas are not dangerous; perhaps they are even necessary to force us to look at economic sanctions through the lens of IR. I just think they still warrant a discussion, if anything, for the sake of self-critique.
Remember that "Kantian fractionalization" article I've pointed to? Look for as close to real-time data as you can, but according to the authors the model predicts out of sample up to 10 years out. I.e., it might already be visible. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC4586843/
Of the Kantian tripod, the (by far) most important in that study are trade and IGOs. Universal IGOs are already dying, being replaced by regional/ideological blocs: fractionalization. Think of these blocs as network communities. They operationalize fractionalization with network modularity: "Larger modularity values signal denser, stronger connections between vertices in the same community relative to the network as a whole, with relatively sparser, weaker connections between communities."
We're not looking for (e.g.) declines in aggregate world trade (Angell's mistake, kinda), we're looking for sharper division of the network into communities. I.e., China buying oil&gas from Russia should not be taken as supportive of world peace because it coincides with Europe refusing to buy oil&gas from Russia: same amount of trade (say), possibly even increasing, but fractionalization into communities that are increasingly isolated from each other.
I have no desire to live through a Great Power War. I mean that both in the sense that I have no desire to see it come, and if it does I have no desire to survive it.
Realists regret to say that they were right all along and the Norman Angells of our time were wrong. I take no pleasure for this. There is no schadenfreude. It's a calamity. A tragedy.
I still think this high level of economic integration (and oligarch pain for a real world war) means we will have lots of smaller, more profitable wars around the world. Still, it only takes one big loser to get a world war. Everything today seems to be about money.
Link isn’t working…
My apologies for that -- this one should work! https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trump-us-china-war/?share-code=OxJmuoJsW8XJ
It says it’s because too many people are trying. I went to the site directly instead where it was a first mentioned. That worked.
But hit a paywall
This one should work without hitting a paywall: https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trump-us-china-war/?share-code=OxJmuoJsW8XJ
I just got in by giving them my e-mail and then clicking on an emailed link.
That worked for me, too.
But I still think it's worth letting Dan know that his attempt to share his article didn't work as expected.
Yes, much appreciated! My apologies for taking so long to fix.
Delighted. No prob on the fix time. New link works.
Yes, definitely.
FWIW, the link doesn't work. I get an error message saying "The page isn’t redirecting properly" (in Firefox) and "This page isn’t working right now /www.worldpoliticsreview.com redirected you too many times" (DuckDuckGo).
Try this link instead: https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trump-us-china-war/?share-code=OxJmuoJsW8XJ
Ditto, whether clicking on the link in the email or here on substack
Sorry, try this one: https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trump-us-china-war/?share-code=OxJmuoJsW8XJ
I will be ready to consider your thesis when I am convinced of this: "U.S. hegemony looks wobbly". I believe we remain our own worst enemy for the moment. Our economy is doing much better than any other great power, our military remains potent and our alliances more robust than any peer competitor.
My candidates for a great, or near great power war are China India and Russia. They can get in each other's shorts via land vis water. The Russia Ukraine War shows a land battle does not necessarily lead to a nuclear exchange. If one of the three wants to smack the US, they have to launch a missile which must be assumed to be nuclear. China is re-evaluating Taiwan in the light of Ukraine.
I highly recommend Jim Sciutto’s book The Return of the Great Powers since you clearly seem to know where the threat lies. Its highly illuminating. I’m listening to the audiobook compliments of Libby.
Am I the only one who thinks Putin's dream scenario is tricking the US and the CCP into fighting a nuclear race war?
Definitely a possibility. It’s always hard to keep a threesome equal.
Not a nuclear war, but a conventional one yes.
Great piece. I'm deeply worried about the idea that "fear of a great power war could lead to one."
I'm a big Noah Smith fan, and he has me largely convinced about the strategic need for rebuilding America's industrial capacity because of concerns about China. At the same time, I definitely worry that his framing of the problem could lead to an arms race that will make war more likely.
And while I was happy about the fact that in one of his recent pieces (https://www.noahpinion.blog/p/tiktok-is-just-the-beginning), he makes the point that when talking about our concerns about China, we should always try to balance it by expressing our respect for Chinese culture and China's accomplishments, as well as differentiate between the regime's leadership and its people; at the same time, I didn't think that's enough.
It would be an insane for both countries if China and the U.S. ever stumbled into war. The interests of both countries simply don't diverge enough for that to ever make sense. But it's easy to imagine scenarios of how that could happen, especially in a situation where America is rebuilding its military arsenal explicitly to prepare for a battle with China, and China believes it has to act fast, before this build-up happens, if it is ever to reunify Taiwan with the mainland.
What I think the world needs is for a Jean Monnet figure to emerge. Someone who understands how destructive war is and also understands that building the right relationships between countries can help prevent that from happening.
The NYT link says China's critical minerals embargo was in response to Biden's December semiconductor sanctions. Sounds like an implied offer to Trump to make a deal? An opportunity to wet his beak. I believe Trump will avoid war with China because he's basically a coward/bully. The kids are more his preferred size around the "Gulf of America" (Mexico erasure, get it?)
Just posted a comment at James Fallows substack covering why I would like to move to Australia soon…
https://open.substack.com/pub/fallows/p/the-worst-part-of-a-terrible-speech?r=7wxj3&utm_campaign=comment-list-share-cta&utm_medium=web&comments=true&commentId=87673479
I’m sure appointments like Pete Hegseth and Tulsi Gabbart will keep us safe
Thanks for crafting this thoughtful and thought-provoking piece on WPR. Some thoughts, not sure if we have the time or space for such discussions.
First, what's the timeline? From the article, are you saying that hot wars are likely happen during the second Trump presidency, or that, absent of course-correction, a war is likely in the future given the increased economic actions in service of geopolitical objectives?
We are clear who the "Great Powers" are: US and allies, China and, to a more diminished extent, Russia. What compels any of these actors to start a hot war?
Russian revanchism is ideologically-driven, but is there not also a heavy dose of pragmatism? The 2022 war, one can argue, is motivated — or rather not inhibited — by the relatively successful 2014 campaign. Would Russian invasion have taken a different form had Western Europe or even Ukrainian resistance been greater during the 2014? Had economic sanctions against Russian after Crimean annexation been greater and more sustained by the EU, say? By this reading, Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 will deter or delay further Russian extraterritorial ambitions because of the military and economic costs. (Counterfactuals are difficult to prove, but nonetheless, I am interested in any thoughts here.)
Then there's the Chinese. I don't know to what extent you subscribe to the idea that PRC has extraterritorial ambitions besides Taiwan and South China Sea, or that PRC leadership's worldview in "East is rising" encompasses more than a revisionistic rebuke to US-led economic and geopolitical order by providing a legitimate alternative to, say, the Global South. Lately, more and more punditry and messages from political establishments have interpreted the PRC mandate as displacing US primacy with a Sinocentric world order. I disagree, in part because, well, of my own bias (as a China "dove") but also from the lack of evidence beyond cherry-picked passages from CCP plenums.
Nonetheless, I would be convinced by a clear-eyed right-sized analysis of Chinese irridentism or martial tendencies. The frequently quoted examples of Chinese gray zone tactics seem threatening but what part of these tactics are 1) reactionary and defense-orientated (and therefore, there is room for foreign policy and diplomatic agency in steering the path away from conflict) 2) preparing for civil-military contingency (and does not warrant political escalation) and 3) provocations to push the boundaries of our norms and order — the salami slicing — (in which case we must react with strict boundaries and reaffirm these boundaries with measured consequences and off-ramps). None of (1), (2) or (3) frame the current US-China tension as the inevitable march towards Thucydides trap. Of course, there's (4) Xi really wants to destroy the US because he hates our freedom. I feel like we heard that one before, some time in the early 2000s.
Maybe greater sanctions that kneecaps Chinese growth can overcome the long-standing tradition of 有理，有利，有节 (righteous, advantageous, measured) or the trend that Chinese assertiveness is negatively correlated with domestic strength. I don't know, and I am suspicious of anyone's claim based on word of mouth alone. #notaccpspy
Moreover, do we have evidence that the Chinese political (and less so business) elites have any appetite for hot wars with US-led coalition? Are these elites in positions of influence? Are we just thinking about Xi, and to what extent he alone can overcome decades (perhaps millenia) of fractured authoritarianism to mobilize in the timeline in question?
Finally, there's the US sudden turn towards expansionism. Who knew we had it in us (anymore)? There is some evidence of our appetite for war, at least with China. Per Pew studies in 2023, around half of Americans are favorable of war with China over Taiwan (in the event of conflict over proclamation of Taiwanese independence); 42% of Americans view the PRC as an enemy nation (as opposed to competitor nation). However, I question whether these numbers accurately reflect our actual appetite for war, given 1) evaluation of war's justifications does not equate to level of wartime support and 2) very few Americans actually went to fight in Ukraine and a growing level of Americans are pushing for a ceasefire — which will inform our near future views of conflicts in general and 3) we have not fought a near peer or a peer military power for a long while, and the economic and political cost, while not immediately imaginable, can quickly become apparent in the period leading up to that war. That is not to say we don't want to fight the Chinese, and maybe that is enough to chip away at your fourth pillar; we are already pushing enough of them — and those who "look like" them — onto the subway tracks.
Still, I question to what extent are these trends shaping a consensus in Washington, and, if not and without a consensus, is it enough for trade wars and countermeasures to compel US public and governing elites to push for war with Panama, Denmark or China. Why would elites take the tremendous political and economic risk of mobilization if they can avoid it, especially (if what I said about China is correct) with significant forewarning and foresight?
There is a tendency to transpose prewar Europe onto the present geopolitical post-post-Cold War actors. Because the elite actors kept diaries and memoirs, and receipts and documents. Galore. Obviously there is tremendous wealth there from which modern IR drew and continue to draw. However, my impulse is always to question parallels to any situation from this time period, however apt, and ask "how can this idea be wrong"? Unlike Allison's Thucydides Trap, your ideas are not dangerous; perhaps they are even necessary to force us to look at economic sanctions through the lens of IR. I just think they still warrant a discussion, if anything, for the sake of self-critique.
Nope, Dan, I'm sad to say that you're right.
Remember that "Kantian fractionalization" article I've pointed to? Look for as close to real-time data as you can, but according to the authors the model predicts out of sample up to 10 years out. I.e., it might already be visible. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC4586843/
Of the Kantian tripod, the (by far) most important in that study are trade and IGOs. Universal IGOs are already dying, being replaced by regional/ideological blocs: fractionalization. Think of these blocs as network communities. They operationalize fractionalization with network modularity: "Larger modularity values signal denser, stronger connections between vertices in the same community relative to the network as a whole, with relatively sparser, weaker connections between communities."
We're not looking for (e.g.) declines in aggregate world trade (Angell's mistake, kinda), we're looking for sharper division of the network into communities. I.e., China buying oil&gas from Russia should not be taken as supportive of world peace because it coincides with Europe refusing to buy oil&gas from Russia: same amount of trade (say), possibly even increasing, but fractionalization into communities that are increasingly isolated from each other.
I have no desire to live through a Great Power War. I mean that both in the sense that I have no desire to see it come, and if it does I have no desire to survive it.
Realists regret to say that they were right all along and the Norman Angells of our time were wrong. I take no pleasure for this. There is no schadenfreude. It's a calamity. A tragedy.
Link doesn't work
Sorry about that: try this one: https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trump-us-china-war/?share-code=OxJmuoJsW8XJ
Still waiting for "Day One" massive immigration raids.
I still think this high level of economic integration (and oligarch pain for a real world war) means we will have lots of smaller, more profitable wars around the world. Still, it only takes one big loser to get a world war. Everything today seems to be about money.