Noah Smith is a smug jerk about history and historians right up until he decides that he can Dunning-Kruger his way into a historically-driven argument ...
My read of Noah was his frustration that no one is acting like they believe it (taking action). I agree with you that predicting these horrible things is not unusual, but if there is no action taken to prepare he is right that no one really believes.
Is there evidence he's wrong the military production capacity issue and there is change happening?
On the Politico piece analyzing the Iranian strike on Israel, what do you think of Reuel Marc Gerecht logical exposition quoted in the piece? Especially Gerecht's *criticism* of the US distancing itself from Israel's strike against Zahedi at the Damascus diplomatic facility in the penultimate line of the paragraph below? Is his critique spot-on, or bass-ackwards?
“I have to give the Biden administration credit. They have responded better than they did when Jerusalem whacked Zahedi in Damascus,” said Reuel Marc Gerecht, a former CIA official and a Farsi-speaking scholar at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. “When that happened, the White House was very quick to signal that the-Israelis-did-it-not-us; this time round, Washington ran towards Israel and has intervened on Israel’s behalf. This will induce greater Iranian anxiety.”
........and does his logic there, jibe with what he went on to the next paragraph, or am I right to sniff out some mentally gymnastic doublethink here:
“Does Khamenei want to escalate against Israel? Yes. Does he want to escalate against the U.S.? No,” said Gerecht. “Unfortunately for the clerical regime, Israel is going to respond directly against it. They have to. The only open question is the magnitude. We are in an escalatory spiral that likely favors Israel more than Tehran in great part because the White House chose not to sit this out and now will be unable to change its commitment to Jerusalem.”
logorrhea avalanche warning: (on the substance of Noah's WWIII type fears and Great Power conflict potential)
A concept that repeatedly comes up in the discourse is that, to one extent or another, Russia and Ukraine, or the Middle East, are distracting us from the "real threat". which is China. There's a wide swathe of people expressing this concept, from a fairly cartoon-ish MAGA and MAGA-adjacent version that says: "Russia likes Trump, Russia good; Trump tariffs China, China bad, so China must love Biden and Biden must love China; Clever strategy must be to tell Russia - 'let's be friends', then Russia will help US against China."
This version of "anti-China first" strategy is fairly easy to counter in its disconnection from the reality of comparative Administration foreign policies, and its naivete about Sino-Russian relations and what drives them. Biden isn't ignoring China but competing with it. Trump was always happy to challenge China on trade or to pass off blame for COVID to China and Chinese people, but was far more erratic about opposing China geopolitically and working with Asian allies to resist China. Also, MAGA conservatives' faith that offering Putin a deal on Ukraine and European questions is the "One Weird Trick" and Nixon-Kissingerian maneuver that would make Russia a willing "friend", supporting American strategy of containment of China is beyond naive. It is a fun-house reverse mirror image of the naive argument that anti-Vietnam War critics, generally liberal, made throughout that struggle that the US need only recognize or side with Ho Chi Minh against his enemy of the day (France, South Vietnam) and, out of gratitude at America *not being against him*, he would cut his ties with the USSR or China and become an apostate Communist like Yugoslavia's Tito. Believe it or not folks, while much of Sino-Soviet relations *are* based around countering the larger US threat to both of them, the two countries are neighbors, and their relationship with each other matter on their own terms. Russia and Putin have no interest, regardless of how successful or tranquil or favorable he regards the situation in Ukraine and Europe, to start antagonizing a China that has not been antagonizing him, and that he and his security establishment, state media and culture have been demonizing for the last few decades like the west.
There are more serious arguments however, from less ideological and less domestically focused sources, to "pivot" more attention and effort to China and the Pacific compared to Russia, Europe, and the Middle East. John Mearsheimer argues for it from a pure International Relations theoretical point-of-view. China's comprehensive national power, across multiple dimensions, and its foundational economic-industrial base, is simply far greater than Russia's, and on the ascendant, compared with Russia's, which is unbalanced, weighted to energy and military sphere, and on the long-term decline. Noah Smith fleshes this out in measuring indices of ability to manufacture physical things, like ships, and all the logistic components required to support protracted conventional war. He notes that, *with China providing supplies* to others like Russia, Iran, and North Korea, their military production would outstrip US production combined with its European, Pacific Rim, and Israeli allies.
If measuring strictly by broad measures of power and capability, rather than intentions, China is the bigger thing to worry about than Russia.
More Allied capacity, in all senses, but especially a military sense, would be very good. Noah Smith has actually pointed out that the dollar/euro value contribution of aid to Ukraine has been higher from Europe than from the USA, but the military support value or combat support value from the USA to Ukraine has been higher than Europe's.
Good piece. Small correction. I suspect you intended the last sentence to read "Whether he is right or not.. " rather than "Where he is right or not ..."
I think Angell was right. Look what's happened in the last world wars, and I don't think we say that, just to pick three, the results in VN, Iraq, & Afghanistan were worth their cost. If Xi is smart, he'll learn from Ukraine that invading Taiwan would be a huge error.
Noah Smith is a smug jerk about history and historians right up until he decides that he can Dunning-Kruger his way into a historically-driven argument ...
My read of Noah was his frustration that no one is acting like they believe it (taking action). I agree with you that predicting these horrible things is not unusual, but if there is no action taken to prepare he is right that no one really believes.
Is there evidence he's wrong the military production capacity issue and there is change happening?
I agree with you and openly state that WWIII is right around the corner
Daniel,
On the Politico piece analyzing the Iranian strike on Israel, what do you think of Reuel Marc Gerecht logical exposition quoted in the piece? Especially Gerecht's *criticism* of the US distancing itself from Israel's strike against Zahedi at the Damascus diplomatic facility in the penultimate line of the paragraph below? Is his critique spot-on, or bass-ackwards?
“I have to give the Biden administration credit. They have responded better than they did when Jerusalem whacked Zahedi in Damascus,” said Reuel Marc Gerecht, a former CIA official and a Farsi-speaking scholar at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. “When that happened, the White House was very quick to signal that the-Israelis-did-it-not-us; this time round, Washington ran towards Israel and has intervened on Israel’s behalf. This will induce greater Iranian anxiety.”
........and does his logic there, jibe with what he went on to the next paragraph, or am I right to sniff out some mentally gymnastic doublethink here:
“Does Khamenei want to escalate against Israel? Yes. Does he want to escalate against the U.S.? No,” said Gerecht. “Unfortunately for the clerical regime, Israel is going to respond directly against it. They have to. The only open question is the magnitude. We are in an escalatory spiral that likely favors Israel more than Tehran in great part because the White House chose not to sit this out and now will be unable to change its commitment to Jerusalem.”
logorrhea avalanche warning: (on the substance of Noah's WWIII type fears and Great Power conflict potential)
A concept that repeatedly comes up in the discourse is that, to one extent or another, Russia and Ukraine, or the Middle East, are distracting us from the "real threat". which is China. There's a wide swathe of people expressing this concept, from a fairly cartoon-ish MAGA and MAGA-adjacent version that says: "Russia likes Trump, Russia good; Trump tariffs China, China bad, so China must love Biden and Biden must love China; Clever strategy must be to tell Russia - 'let's be friends', then Russia will help US against China."
This version of "anti-China first" strategy is fairly easy to counter in its disconnection from the reality of comparative Administration foreign policies, and its naivete about Sino-Russian relations and what drives them. Biden isn't ignoring China but competing with it. Trump was always happy to challenge China on trade or to pass off blame for COVID to China and Chinese people, but was far more erratic about opposing China geopolitically and working with Asian allies to resist China. Also, MAGA conservatives' faith that offering Putin a deal on Ukraine and European questions is the "One Weird Trick" and Nixon-Kissingerian maneuver that would make Russia a willing "friend", supporting American strategy of containment of China is beyond naive. It is a fun-house reverse mirror image of the naive argument that anti-Vietnam War critics, generally liberal, made throughout that struggle that the US need only recognize or side with Ho Chi Minh against his enemy of the day (France, South Vietnam) and, out of gratitude at America *not being against him*, he would cut his ties with the USSR or China and become an apostate Communist like Yugoslavia's Tito. Believe it or not folks, while much of Sino-Soviet relations *are* based around countering the larger US threat to both of them, the two countries are neighbors, and their relationship with each other matter on their own terms. Russia and Putin have no interest, regardless of how successful or tranquil or favorable he regards the situation in Ukraine and Europe, to start antagonizing a China that has not been antagonizing him, and that he and his security establishment, state media and culture have been demonizing for the last few decades like the west.
There are more serious arguments however, from less ideological and less domestically focused sources, to "pivot" more attention and effort to China and the Pacific compared to Russia, Europe, and the Middle East. John Mearsheimer argues for it from a pure International Relations theoretical point-of-view. China's comprehensive national power, across multiple dimensions, and its foundational economic-industrial base, is simply far greater than Russia's, and on the ascendant, compared with Russia's, which is unbalanced, weighted to energy and military sphere, and on the long-term decline. Noah Smith fleshes this out in measuring indices of ability to manufacture physical things, like ships, and all the logistic components required to support protracted conventional war. He notes that, *with China providing supplies* to others like Russia, Iran, and North Korea, their military production would outstrip US production combined with its European, Pacific Rim, and Israeli allies.
If measuring strictly by broad measures of power and capability, rather than intentions, China is the bigger thing to worry about than Russia.
More Allied capacity, in all senses, but especially a military sense, would be very good. Noah Smith has actually pointed out that the dollar/euro value contribution of aid to Ukraine has been higher from Europe than from the USA, but the military support value or combat support value from the USA to Ukraine has been higher than Europe's.
Good piece. Small correction. I suspect you intended the last sentence to read "Whether he is right or not.. " rather than "Where he is right or not ..."
You say
“ Smith’s observations about the downsides of predicting disaster do or make any sense in the world of international relations”
There is a missing “don’t “ I think.
Generally, the issue in predictions is lack of specificity, rather than optimism or pessimism.
I think Angell was right. Look what's happened in the last world wars, and I don't think we say that, just to pick three, the results in VN, Iraq, & Afghanistan were worth their cost. If Xi is smart, he'll learn from Ukraine that invading Taiwan would be a huge error.