Dan, this is not what Macron says. He apes Mearsheimer & co in the lie that the invasion was provoked by NATO on Russia's doorstep. This cannot be addressed -- what, we're going to kick out Turkey or, soon, Finland? And how come Russia lived with Turkey in NATO despite centuries of fighting the Turks? Any security structure after the war would have to be based on deterrence because Russia isn't going away and is unlikely to get what it wants now. This means Ukraine would never be "demilitarized" as the Russians want. Rather, it will have to build a large defense industry and field a very large citizen army of the Israeli type. Since even this will probably not be enough to withstand a protracted war with Russia, Ukraine would have to be integrated into an alliance with leading Western nations, with USA/UK as minimum, but maybe even Germany too (Scholz hinted at a more active role for Germany in European security). Hence, there will be no "neutrality" as Russia defines it either. This will be true even if the Ukrainians end up conceding some territory in the current war (Crimea, for instance). The idea that Russia is fearful of NATO is just wrong. They hate NATO expansion, that's true. But they also hate EU expansion, and that's not because the EU can invade Russia. Both are caused by the same: they provide an economic pull and a security umbrella to countries along the Russian borders that deny Moscow their desire to dominate them. We had to settle for that dominance in 1945. As a native of one of the countries abandoned to the communists back then, I very much hope we do not do the same today. It would be a monumental mistake.
It was an education learning about 'the Phoenix Effect' but is Russia a good candidate for recovery let alone resurrection? My understanding is that its demographic outlook is bad, bad BAD. The war markedly worsens it. Not only will a large number of soldiers come back dead, wounded or unlikely to be effective fathers from psychological damage, but much, much higher numbers of its best, brightest and most enterprising have got the hell out of there. It's compedative advantage in gas and oil will diminish as the world largely electrifies as renewables grow and outprice fossil fuels. It will struggle big time getting anyone willing to invest the big money in resources for many years. It's made itself a poster boy for sovereign risk. And who's to say the country won't internally fragment when the would-be emprorer of the New Russian Empire dies? Russia's (aging and probably ill maintained) nukes will make it a country that can't be ignored but it's on a fast track to geo-political irrelevance and my guess is that in 20 years (perhaps sooner) no one is going to care much about what it thinks or does. It'll probably be a not particularly important client state of China.
Dan, this is not what Macron says. He apes Mearsheimer & co in the lie that the invasion was provoked by NATO on Russia's doorstep. This cannot be addressed -- what, we're going to kick out Turkey or, soon, Finland? And how come Russia lived with Turkey in NATO despite centuries of fighting the Turks? Any security structure after the war would have to be based on deterrence because Russia isn't going away and is unlikely to get what it wants now. This means Ukraine would never be "demilitarized" as the Russians want. Rather, it will have to build a large defense industry and field a very large citizen army of the Israeli type. Since even this will probably not be enough to withstand a protracted war with Russia, Ukraine would have to be integrated into an alliance with leading Western nations, with USA/UK as minimum, but maybe even Germany too (Scholz hinted at a more active role for Germany in European security). Hence, there will be no "neutrality" as Russia defines it either. This will be true even if the Ukrainians end up conceding some territory in the current war (Crimea, for instance). The idea that Russia is fearful of NATO is just wrong. They hate NATO expansion, that's true. But they also hate EU expansion, and that's not because the EU can invade Russia. Both are caused by the same: they provide an economic pull and a security umbrella to countries along the Russian borders that deny Moscow their desire to dominate them. We had to settle for that dominance in 1945. As a native of one of the countries abandoned to the communists back then, I very much hope we do not do the same today. It would be a monumental mistake.
It was an education learning about 'the Phoenix Effect' but is Russia a good candidate for recovery let alone resurrection? My understanding is that its demographic outlook is bad, bad BAD. The war markedly worsens it. Not only will a large number of soldiers come back dead, wounded or unlikely to be effective fathers from psychological damage, but much, much higher numbers of its best, brightest and most enterprising have got the hell out of there. It's compedative advantage in gas and oil will diminish as the world largely electrifies as renewables grow and outprice fossil fuels. It will struggle big time getting anyone willing to invest the big money in resources for many years. It's made itself a poster boy for sovereign risk. And who's to say the country won't internally fragment when the would-be emprorer of the New Russian Empire dies? Russia's (aging and probably ill maintained) nukes will make it a country that can't be ignored but it's on a fast track to geo-political irrelevance and my guess is that in 20 years (perhaps sooner) no one is going to care much about what it thinks or does. It'll probably be a not particularly important client state of China.