Anything that can be achieved through an intermediary that relies for its info on the principal can be achieved through direct communication between principals. Track II is useful for domestic political reasons--the argument here is different.
To be fair the writer of the report probably didn't write the headline - the sub-editor did - and these people's key concern is attracting eye-ball. This is the case even with high brow outlets. I suppose it's fair enough but the Good Prof is right. The is a HUGE ado about something awfully close to nothing. Calm down folks!
Actually, I wrote that the folks participating in this were not well connected to the Biden administration but that Track II talks can be helpful. Did you read this post?
I read it. If they are not connected & have no influence in the admin, then the Russians have no reason to deal with them & they have nothing to offer. And if they do have something to offer, then these talks are entirely inappropriate.
So you seem determined to treat connectedness as a dichotomous rather than a continuous variable, assume that the Russians have full information about who is connected in the Biden administration, and invent a new norm what considers Track II diplomacy to be inappropriate. Maybe take the rest of the day off and reconsider?
I don’t need a day to see that your argument is weak. Since you want uncertainty, whether the variable is dichotomous or not is irrelevant: you will get your “continuity” through the belief distribution. So let’s say you have two types, C and N (connected and not) and Russia is unsure which. Talking to N is irrelevant and potentially bad b/c they won’t influence policy but could transmit info. Talking to C could be fruitful. Clearly, Russia will only talk if belief in C is large enough AND they believe it’s the C kind that will help them. Given the publications by Haas & Kupchan since the start of the war, they know they are sympathetic to Russia. Given Biden admin policies, this will make them somewhat out of sync with the admin. Now you have to argue that belief they are C was high enough anyway AND that revealing readiness to some terms won’t make the nonsympathetic admin more determined to stay the course. That’s hard to see so upshot is that whatever Lavrov was communicating it would be enough to bolster these peoples talking points within admin (because C type will talk to admin) -- so lots of lying. OTOH, if these types ARE really C type, their willingness to talk reveals fissures between public stance of unity and internal distribution of preferences. Upshot is that for the communication to transmit any info (C type likely), the downsides of revealing to Russia disunity are likely far outweighed by whatever they think they learned from Lavrov
Since I think the downsides of "revealing to Russia disunity" are minimal, in that any such "revelation" is counterbalanced by Lavrov's revealed preference to negotiate and what you describe as "disunity" I see as not terribly significant differences of opinion, those costs are indeed far outweighed by whatever they think they learned from Lavrov (which, as referenced above, might merely be the myths that Russians are telling themselves about the war).
Lavrov is unlikely to reveal anything for the reasons in described. Therefore, his willingness to talk is meaningless. This is true whether they do it being closed doors or -- as they often do -- proclaim publicly their readiness to negotiate. Everyone understands that it’s meaningless because they invariably insist on the same demands they started the war with, as preconditions to these talks. As for what we are revealing, you are ignoring the theory of war termination (Hein Goemans and I wrote about this several weeks ago in the Atlantic), and the fact that anything that suggests we are not fully committed increases Russia’s incentives to try to outlast our aid to Ukraine. This increases the duration of the war and everything else that these people are claiming they wish to avoid. It also increases the risks and costs to us bebaust we have to engage in higher escalation to undo unduly optimistic assessments.
Were these conversations really "secret" if no one cares beforehand and then the attendees publicize them afterwards?
If it weren’t for track II channels, we’d have never had the JCPOA.
Anything that can be achieved through an intermediary that relies for its info on the principal can be achieved through direct communication between principals. Track II is useful for domestic political reasons--the argument here is different.
To be fair the writer of the report probably didn't write the headline - the sub-editor did - and these people's key concern is attracting eye-ball. This is the case even with high brow outlets. I suppose it's fair enough but the Good Prof is right. The is a HUGE ado about something awfully close to nothing. Calm down folks!
So... the folks participating in this are irrelevant but it’s good to have these kinds of talks because they are helpful. Did you proofread this post?
Actually, I wrote that the folks participating in this were not well connected to the Biden administration but that Track II talks can be helpful. Did you read this post?
I read it. If they are not connected & have no influence in the admin, then the Russians have no reason to deal with them & they have nothing to offer. And if they do have something to offer, then these talks are entirely inappropriate.
So you seem determined to treat connectedness as a dichotomous rather than a continuous variable, assume that the Russians have full information about who is connected in the Biden administration, and invent a new norm what considers Track II diplomacy to be inappropriate. Maybe take the rest of the day off and reconsider?
I don’t need a day to see that your argument is weak. Since you want uncertainty, whether the variable is dichotomous or not is irrelevant: you will get your “continuity” through the belief distribution. So let’s say you have two types, C and N (connected and not) and Russia is unsure which. Talking to N is irrelevant and potentially bad b/c they won’t influence policy but could transmit info. Talking to C could be fruitful. Clearly, Russia will only talk if belief in C is large enough AND they believe it’s the C kind that will help them. Given the publications by Haas & Kupchan since the start of the war, they know they are sympathetic to Russia. Given Biden admin policies, this will make them somewhat out of sync with the admin. Now you have to argue that belief they are C was high enough anyway AND that revealing readiness to some terms won’t make the nonsympathetic admin more determined to stay the course. That’s hard to see so upshot is that whatever Lavrov was communicating it would be enough to bolster these peoples talking points within admin (because C type will talk to admin) -- so lots of lying. OTOH, if these types ARE really C type, their willingness to talk reveals fissures between public stance of unity and internal distribution of preferences. Upshot is that for the communication to transmit any info (C type likely), the downsides of revealing to Russia disunity are likely far outweighed by whatever they think they learned from Lavrov
Since I think the downsides of "revealing to Russia disunity" are minimal, in that any such "revelation" is counterbalanced by Lavrov's revealed preference to negotiate and what you describe as "disunity" I see as not terribly significant differences of opinion, those costs are indeed far outweighed by whatever they think they learned from Lavrov (which, as referenced above, might merely be the myths that Russians are telling themselves about the war).
Lavrov is unlikely to reveal anything for the reasons in described. Therefore, his willingness to talk is meaningless. This is true whether they do it being closed doors or -- as they often do -- proclaim publicly their readiness to negotiate. Everyone understands that it’s meaningless because they invariably insist on the same demands they started the war with, as preconditions to these talks. As for what we are revealing, you are ignoring the theory of war termination (Hein Goemans and I wrote about this several weeks ago in the Atlantic), and the fact that anything that suggests we are not fully committed increases Russia’s incentives to try to outlast our aid to Ukraine. This increases the duration of the war and everything else that these people are claiming they wish to avoid. It also increases the risks and costs to us bebaust we have to engage in higher escalation to undo unduly optimistic assessments.
Good analysis. I hope the Ukrainians were read in early on.