Although my experience in intel is limited to working in MI in USEUR 50 years ago, what you say now was true then. In fact, if memory serves, John Keegan wrote a whole book on how intel was thought to be more important than it actually is.
This is true always and everywhere. Given the possibility of deception, information obtained by spying has zero or negative value in most cases. Value is positive if the information is unfakeable (the Bruce-Partington plans), or if the other side doesn't know you are spying (but you can never know this. https://johnquiggin.com/2013/11/23/why-spies-never-discover-anything-useful/
I'm reminded of the mighty balloon army that Gen. Patton was amassing in England pre-invasion in 44. Field Marshall Rommel watched no one closer than Patton and George's Potemkin army was aimed at Calais which was a naturally appealing invasion point.
As Alex Clarkson noted, the big scandal here is that too many people without the need to know get too much classified intelligence in the DOD and DC in general.
But there isn’t much here here. We knew that the US has been able to penetrate Russian intelligence deeply before Putin’s invasion of UA (I mean, the US showed the world Putin’s plans). Ever since then, all evidence is that Russia still leaks intelligence like a sieve. Russia either can’t or won’t repair the leaks.
It seems to be almost entirely SIGINT so no human sources endangered.
And finally, while the dire state of UA’s air defenses may be news to the lay public, I really doubt Russia was in the dark considering that they have a pretty good idea much many SAMs UA has, how much they have fired in to UA, and how many struck anything.
I listened to a recent podcast with Jon Stewart interviewing a Yale professor (sorry I can’t remember his name) about US security classification systems and how many people actually see the “top secret” documents. The problem of “intelligence” and “security” is massive in this country, but the bubble it creates around those responsible for keeping secret documents secret is easily pierced by common knowledge.
Although my experience in intel is limited to working in MI in USEUR 50 years ago, what you say now was true then. In fact, if memory serves, John Keegan wrote a whole book on how intel was thought to be more important than it actually is.
A lot of this Intel is common knowledge and what isn't obvious can be found in a number of publications if you read between the lines.
This is true always and everywhere. Given the possibility of deception, information obtained by spying has zero or negative value in most cases. Value is positive if the information is unfakeable (the Bruce-Partington plans), or if the other side doesn't know you are spying (but you can never know this. https://johnquiggin.com/2013/11/23/why-spies-never-discover-anything-useful/
I'm reminded of the mighty balloon army that Gen. Patton was amassing in England pre-invasion in 44. Field Marshall Rommel watched no one closer than Patton and George's Potemkin army was aimed at Calais which was a naturally appealing invasion point.
As Alex Clarkson noted, the big scandal here is that too many people without the need to know get too much classified intelligence in the DOD and DC in general.
But there isn’t much here here. We knew that the US has been able to penetrate Russian intelligence deeply before Putin’s invasion of UA (I mean, the US showed the world Putin’s plans). Ever since then, all evidence is that Russia still leaks intelligence like a sieve. Russia either can’t or won’t repair the leaks.
It seems to be almost entirely SIGINT so no human sources endangered.
And finally, while the dire state of UA’s air defenses may be news to the lay public, I really doubt Russia was in the dark considering that they have a pretty good idea much many SAMs UA has, how much they have fired in to UA, and how many struck anything.
You are so level-headed and well informed that I now check here even before coffee in the morning. Consistently reassuring...
I listened to a recent podcast with Jon Stewart interviewing a Yale professor (sorry I can’t remember his name) about US security classification systems and how many people actually see the “top secret” documents. The problem of “intelligence” and “security” is massive in this country, but the bubble it creates around those responsible for keeping secret documents secret is easily pierced by common knowledge.