Expectation is a complicated word in these kinds of discussions--it goes right to the heart of the question of what it is that Putin and his associates thought would happen in this war, and what they wanted to happen. I presume in any event that one of things they did not *want* was for Europe and the United States to become more united and more committed to opposing Russia's invasion of Ukraine. But it feels harder to be sure that they didn't *expect* that, or had any explicit expectation of what would happen in that respect. (It may be that Putin was led to expect a quick victory in Ukraine, and hence had no discussions whatsoever of what any international opposition would do beyond make a lot of noise.) I think diplomatic protesting about escalation etc. is almost de rigeur and would be happening whether or not they had an accurate model of the coalition's resolve or not. (Rather like talk of a "red line" over chemical weapons use in Syria or elsewhere--an obligatory kind of rhetoric that predicts very little about actual response, where the hope is that talking as if something dramatic is going to happen is thought to be in and of itself sufficient to make the other side think twice.)
Following Ryan's point, if Putin et al really did want to divide the coalition, the way to do it cynically would be to make conciliatory noises, pretend to be in favor of talks about security agreements, promise that the annexations might be negotiable, etc. without any intention of doing any of that. So either the Russian leadership understands perfectly well that the coalition is going to remain pretty united as long as Russia is pursuing total victory and using hard-line tactics and they really don't care or they really, really do not understand their adversaries. Or the people making decisions are having information withheld from them.
Every escalation undertaken by Russia has served to unite the opposing coalition further. If Putin wants to undermine that coalition he would need to do a 180 and start de-escalating. End attacks on Ukraine's civilian infrastructure. Shift state propaganda towards sane and conciliatory rhetoric. Formally renounce annexations of Ukrainian territory. Begin withdrawals, and promise to ultimately retreat to somewhere near the line of control on February 24th.
Under such a scenario real pressure might be applied to Ukraine to abandon their full war aims and negotiate with this newly "reasonable" Russia.
Unfortunately, I have serious doubts such actions are even possible under the leadership of Vladimir Putin.
Prof Drezner, I just saw a report about Ukraine poised to take back Crimea, but if they do, what will they do to the generation old Russian navy base on the west coast of Crimea? Do they have a plan for that?
TBF, it’s been equally surprising, at least to me, that Putin has been willing to throw more and more blood and money into this disaster despite continuous efforts to give him an off-ramp
Do the Ukranians have anybody that can actually fly an F-16, especially in combat with Russian pilots? Maybe you can stick an untrained guy in a tank and hope for the best, but an F-16?
Expectation is a complicated word in these kinds of discussions--it goes right to the heart of the question of what it is that Putin and his associates thought would happen in this war, and what they wanted to happen. I presume in any event that one of things they did not *want* was for Europe and the United States to become more united and more committed to opposing Russia's invasion of Ukraine. But it feels harder to be sure that they didn't *expect* that, or had any explicit expectation of what would happen in that respect. (It may be that Putin was led to expect a quick victory in Ukraine, and hence had no discussions whatsoever of what any international opposition would do beyond make a lot of noise.) I think diplomatic protesting about escalation etc. is almost de rigeur and would be happening whether or not they had an accurate model of the coalition's resolve or not. (Rather like talk of a "red line" over chemical weapons use in Syria or elsewhere--an obligatory kind of rhetoric that predicts very little about actual response, where the hope is that talking as if something dramatic is going to happen is thought to be in and of itself sufficient to make the other side think twice.)
Following Ryan's point, if Putin et al really did want to divide the coalition, the way to do it cynically would be to make conciliatory noises, pretend to be in favor of talks about security agreements, promise that the annexations might be negotiable, etc. without any intention of doing any of that. So either the Russian leadership understands perfectly well that the coalition is going to remain pretty united as long as Russia is pursuing total victory and using hard-line tactics and they really don't care or they really, really do not understand their adversaries. Or the people making decisions are having information withheld from them.
Every escalation undertaken by Russia has served to unite the opposing coalition further. If Putin wants to undermine that coalition he would need to do a 180 and start de-escalating. End attacks on Ukraine's civilian infrastructure. Shift state propaganda towards sane and conciliatory rhetoric. Formally renounce annexations of Ukrainian territory. Begin withdrawals, and promise to ultimately retreat to somewhere near the line of control on February 24th.
Under such a scenario real pressure might be applied to Ukraine to abandon their full war aims and negotiate with this newly "reasonable" Russia.
Unfortunately, I have serious doubts such actions are even possible under the leadership of Vladimir Putin.
Prof Drezner, I just saw a report about Ukraine poised to take back Crimea, but if they do, what will they do to the generation old Russian navy base on the west coast of Crimea? Do they have a plan for that?
TBF, it’s been equally surprising, at least to me, that Putin has been willing to throw more and more blood and money into this disaster despite continuous efforts to give him an off-ramp
Do the Ukranians have anybody that can actually fly an F-16, especially in combat with Russian pilots? Maybe you can stick an untrained guy in a tank and hope for the best, but an F-16?