It's rather hyperbolic to say that the current critique of supply chain fragility is horseshit.
The nut of the argument as I understand it is this:
"A closer look at global value chains reveals ways that both public-sector and private-sector actors have prioritized short-term efficiency at the expense of long-term resilience."
That is true, and I agree that nothing in the current public trade debate distinguishes that from open trade. However, since in general the neoliberal free trade establishment has been highly resistant to considering impacts beyond "market success" (as defined in very narrow terms), perhaps it is forgivable that both the public and politicians are eliding this difference.
The more interesting question to me is what it looks like when trade is reasonably free but *does* address these broader social effects and potentially some policy mechanisms that discourage both the overly short-term focus and the concentration of market power and wealth.
I would be interested to hear more about what free trade-leaning folks have think about policy prescriptions for these problems, as well as how to make the space for them politically. For example, with respect to market concentration, it seems increasingly clear that one of the consequences of technological advances is that it is very easy for markets to become extremely concentrated. I am not a libertarian, so I have no problem with the idea of government taking a stronger anti-monopoly actions in many arenas. It be interesting to hear your take on those sort of policy approaches.
Dan, this is an interesting post even though I'm not sure I totally agree with it.
Can I suggest that you remove the "sweet and sour" description of Tai's speech? It just kind of sounds like a racial stereotype of Tai where I think none is intended and it distracts from the substantive critique you are making.
There's no difference here. The principle is that vital value chains must be kept within the alliance of democratic countries. That implies guarding against the possibility that current democracies will cease to be so. That's quite likely in the case of the US,.
Democratic entities would also be wary of other democratic entities stopping to be democratic entities is the point, unless that concern can be addressed.
It's rather hyperbolic to say that the current critique of supply chain fragility is horseshit.
The nut of the argument as I understand it is this:
"A closer look at global value chains reveals ways that both public-sector and private-sector actors have prioritized short-term efficiency at the expense of long-term resilience."
That is true, and I agree that nothing in the current public trade debate distinguishes that from open trade. However, since in general the neoliberal free trade establishment has been highly resistant to considering impacts beyond "market success" (as defined in very narrow terms), perhaps it is forgivable that both the public and politicians are eliding this difference.
The more interesting question to me is what it looks like when trade is reasonably free but *does* address these broader social effects and potentially some policy mechanisms that discourage both the overly short-term focus and the concentration of market power and wealth.
I would be interested to hear more about what free trade-leaning folks have think about policy prescriptions for these problems, as well as how to make the space for them politically. For example, with respect to market concentration, it seems increasingly clear that one of the consequences of technological advances is that it is very easy for markets to become extremely concentrated. I am not a libertarian, so I have no problem with the idea of government taking a stronger anti-monopoly actions in many arenas. It be interesting to hear your take on those sort of policy approaches.
Dan, this is an interesting post even though I'm not sure I totally agree with it.
Can I suggest that you remove the "sweet and sour" description of Tai's speech? It just kind of sounds like a racial stereotype of Tai where I think none is intended and it distracts from the substantive critique you are making.
There's no difference here. The principle is that vital value chains must be kept within the alliance of democratic countries. That implies guarding against the possibility that current democracies will cease to be so. That's quite likely in the case of the US,.
Democratic entities would also be wary of other democratic entities stopping to be democratic entities is the point, unless that concern can be addressed.
And Iran has raised the same issue of US constancy in negotiations over its nukes.