Given the cost differential between military & sanctions responses- the first one has a reasonable chance of leading to out-of-control escalation, the second one much less so- the expected benefit of a military response would have to be much greater than that of a sanctions response to dismiss a sanctions response.
I don't see that difference in expected benefit. Short of a massive pre-emptive nuclear strike- which would cause a counter-response- the military response would not leave Russia incapable of future nuclear attacks. It could also unite the Russian population behind Putin.
Yes, sanctions would require Chinese cooperation, and China would has reasons not to cooperate. However, China has at least one major reason to cooperate- they don't want a major nuclear exchange any more than we do. There's a lot of room to be explored for forms of sanction that would be both effective & that China would agree to. Just as an example, one could imagine a revamped NPT that requires member states to impose sanctions as soon as any state uses nuclear weapons.
While I realize that pattern recognition with sanctions regimes suggests that they don't work, given the cost differential, I think it would be irresponsible of the US government if it is not now doing everything it can to attempt to create an effective post-nuclear-use sanctions response.
"The thing is, the more I think about it the more convinced I am that no articulated sanctions threat will successfully deter Putin from using nuclear weapons. "
Concur. I think the working deterrent here is that Vladimir Putin does not want to to die in a fireball.
elm
good job on arming ukraine then - no talking himself into the idea that the US/UK/France are just going to roll over for bomb threats
What about the threat of the ultimate economic sanction, the Blockade? Of course you wouldn't call it a blockade, "quarantine" worked for JFK, and it would probably be best not to call it anything at all, as Russia did when it effectively blockaded Ukraine. But make it clear to Russia ahead of time that no ships would be coming into or out of their ports the moment a mushroom cloud appears in Ukraine.
Thanks Daniel, for this commentary and response to my piece. I think we see the world the same way here, that we would both like the threat of sanctions to be strong enough to be used as a deterrent, but also both sanguine about the willingness of key states to take the action needed for this to be true. That being said, I don't like taking options off the table, as they say. As you know well, deterrence is about denial or punishment. I remain convinced we can do this without a nuclear response and with some effective combination of both conventional military and economic/diplomatic steps. If not, then maybe the whole nuclear deterrence works is not up to this road test.
Given the cost differential between military & sanctions responses- the first one has a reasonable chance of leading to out-of-control escalation, the second one much less so- the expected benefit of a military response would have to be much greater than that of a sanctions response to dismiss a sanctions response.
I don't see that difference in expected benefit. Short of a massive pre-emptive nuclear strike- which would cause a counter-response- the military response would not leave Russia incapable of future nuclear attacks. It could also unite the Russian population behind Putin.
Yes, sanctions would require Chinese cooperation, and China would has reasons not to cooperate. However, China has at least one major reason to cooperate- they don't want a major nuclear exchange any more than we do. There's a lot of room to be explored for forms of sanction that would be both effective & that China would agree to. Just as an example, one could imagine a revamped NPT that requires member states to impose sanctions as soon as any state uses nuclear weapons.
While I realize that pattern recognition with sanctions regimes suggests that they don't work, given the cost differential, I think it would be irresponsible of the US government if it is not now doing everything it can to attempt to create an effective post-nuclear-use sanctions response.
So what is your realistic suggestion as to deterrence or response?
"The thing is, the more I think about it the more convinced I am that no articulated sanctions threat will successfully deter Putin from using nuclear weapons. "
Concur. I think the working deterrent here is that Vladimir Putin does not want to to die in a fireball.
elm
good job on arming ukraine then - no talking himself into the idea that the US/UK/France are just going to roll over for bomb threats
It would be lovely if determined economic sanctions would stop nuclear use but we must deal with the world as it is and not as we would like it to be.
What about the threat of the ultimate economic sanction, the Blockade? Of course you wouldn't call it a blockade, "quarantine" worked for JFK, and it would probably be best not to call it anything at all, as Russia did when it effectively blockaded Ukraine. But make it clear to Russia ahead of time that no ships would be coming into or out of their ports the moment a mushroom cloud appears in Ukraine.
Thanks Daniel, for this commentary and response to my piece. I think we see the world the same way here, that we would both like the threat of sanctions to be strong enough to be used as a deterrent, but also both sanguine about the willingness of key states to take the action needed for this to be true. That being said, I don't like taking options off the table, as they say. As you know well, deterrence is about denial or punishment. I remain convinced we can do this without a nuclear response and with some effective combination of both conventional military and economic/diplomatic steps. If not, then maybe the whole nuclear deterrence works is not up to this road test.