"NATO can send whatever weapons it likes to Ukraine, and Russia will do little but noisily object." We hope. Pre-war, Putin backed rhetoric up with mobilization. We were told this was a bluff, nothing would happen. Then it did.
Let's also not forget Russia will never, ever concede the Donbas, a Russian-speaking region they always nominally controlled. That part's over. We're told a lot of lies in this thing. One is that they want the whole of Ukraine. This is impossible and they know it, it would be another Afghanistan, futile. unwinnable.
"We were told this was a bluff, nothing would happen."
Who told us it was a bluff?
Our host, Dan D.? Maybe some individual pundits or analysts. They're each accountable for what they say. Maybe some European government leaders. The Ukrainian government didn't quite believe. The US government and President Biden, in the week or two beforehand were *not* calling this a bluff but were calling this very likely although calling it very undesired/unwanted. The US government didn't do *more* to stop it, if by more you mean escalating stakes and threats and military positioning because it did not want to make threats it was not prepared to carry out, and it did not want to carry out threats leading to direct conflict. And it did not do *more* in terms of diplomatic talks or concessions because they thought the odds of that preventing an invasion through even any limited guarantees related to the Ukrainian status quo were not good enough to justify the domestic and intra-alliance heat the US would take for making any concessions and the invitation to Moscow to haggle for more.*
*Indeed - Putin did make an "offer" beforehand to not invade in return for promising to not have Ukraine join NATO, and multiple other restraints on NATO freedom of action in Europe east of Germany. People in the US government and a lot of people watching this unfold took this as a) an ultimatum, or b) Putin's bottom-line, or c) a sign he was unserious because it was an offer he knew the alliance couldn't accept. I suppose there is an argument the US and rest of NATO could have agreed to talk and just regarded Putin's offer as an exaggerated opening bid, "oh yeah, we can talk.....uh, no, you're not getting that" but where he got some sort of pledge, perpetual, or for some timeline spanning Putin's natural lifespan, to leave Ukraine out of NATO.
Your comment rather makes my point. As you say, NATO didn't react to the long pre-war buildup. The MSM said Russia was bluffing. Clearly they were not, and in hindsight we should have initiated hardline negotiations, an epic fail.
Well, I could agree that there was policy failure to prevent the war from happening - through genuine bargaining. - and it would really be interesting to see what Dan D. would say on that score.
I also think that to the extent the MSM, especially for the first year has had admiration for Administration policy on Ukraine, it is sort of over-enjoying Russian failures to the point of confusing them with US successes, or a complete policy, or a resolution of the issue. Attempts to engage in give and take bargaining with Russia though would risk bad consequences as well as possibly open up positive opportunities, or might make no net difference.
I know it may sound like hair-splitting to you, but to me it is important that policy failure to prevent the war from happening, and perhaps the MSM and the west's *acting* as if Russia was bluffing, might have been a knowledge failure and communication failure on the part of MSM and some western leaders and Ukrainians, but it was *not* a knowledge failure or communication failure of the Biden Administration in the weeks ahead of the invasion - he said "Russia is going to do it" and "Russia don't do it" at the same time. And btw, the US is not omnipotent and Putin chose the war.
It is also interesting that people are so stuck in their narratives and expectations of what certain actors do and do not do, that, nobody ever asks - "Why did Trump and Putin not use their personal regard for each other for something other than a personal purpose, and use it to strengthen great power peace, via perhaps a Ukrainian neutrality deal, a Caucasus neutrality deal, and/or revival and strengthening of the START treaty and nuclear arms control?"
Just reading that question makes it sound like the questioner must be from an alternate universe.
If there *was*, a *something* forcing Putin's hand - we haven't discussed any specifics. Ukraine's train to NATO station was going nowhere fast. Zelensky was elected very much to focus on domestic reform without much foreign policy focus or public mandate to get overexcited about getting into NATO soon. Now, like nearly all Ukrainian politicians, he's obligated to take the position that Ukraine rightly owns all its pre-2014 territory, and nobody can make it promise to *not* join any alliance. But that does not mean any forward movement. And when does the EU let *anyone* in fast, and deliver well on its promises?
So what was forcing Putin's hand in Biden's term, other than an imperative on his part to change the Ukrainian status quo in his favor and possibly seeing the status quo become more entrenched, and more difficult to attack?
"NATO can send whatever weapons it likes to Ukraine, and Russia will do little but noisily object." We hope. Pre-war, Putin backed rhetoric up with mobilization. We were told this was a bluff, nothing would happen. Then it did.
Let's also not forget Russia will never, ever concede the Donbas, a Russian-speaking region they always nominally controlled. That part's over. We're told a lot of lies in this thing. One is that they want the whole of Ukraine. This is impossible and they know it, it would be another Afghanistan, futile. unwinnable.
"We were told this was a bluff, nothing would happen."
Who told us it was a bluff?
Our host, Dan D.? Maybe some individual pundits or analysts. They're each accountable for what they say. Maybe some European government leaders. The Ukrainian government didn't quite believe. The US government and President Biden, in the week or two beforehand were *not* calling this a bluff but were calling this very likely although calling it very undesired/unwanted. The US government didn't do *more* to stop it, if by more you mean escalating stakes and threats and military positioning because it did not want to make threats it was not prepared to carry out, and it did not want to carry out threats leading to direct conflict. And it did not do *more* in terms of diplomatic talks or concessions because they thought the odds of that preventing an invasion through even any limited guarantees related to the Ukrainian status quo were not good enough to justify the domestic and intra-alliance heat the US would take for making any concessions and the invitation to Moscow to haggle for more.*
*Indeed - Putin did make an "offer" beforehand to not invade in return for promising to not have Ukraine join NATO, and multiple other restraints on NATO freedom of action in Europe east of Germany. People in the US government and a lot of people watching this unfold took this as a) an ultimatum, or b) Putin's bottom-line, or c) a sign he was unserious because it was an offer he knew the alliance couldn't accept. I suppose there is an argument the US and rest of NATO could have agreed to talk and just regarded Putin's offer as an exaggerated opening bid, "oh yeah, we can talk.....uh, no, you're not getting that" but where he got some sort of pledge, perpetual, or for some timeline spanning Putin's natural lifespan, to leave Ukraine out of NATO.
Your comment rather makes my point. As you say, NATO didn't react to the long pre-war buildup. The MSM said Russia was bluffing. Clearly they were not, and in hindsight we should have initiated hardline negotiations, an epic fail.
Well, I could agree that there was policy failure to prevent the war from happening - through genuine bargaining. - and it would really be interesting to see what Dan D. would say on that score.
I also think that to the extent the MSM, especially for the first year has had admiration for Administration policy on Ukraine, it is sort of over-enjoying Russian failures to the point of confusing them with US successes, or a complete policy, or a resolution of the issue. Attempts to engage in give and take bargaining with Russia though would risk bad consequences as well as possibly open up positive opportunities, or might make no net difference.
I know it may sound like hair-splitting to you, but to me it is important that policy failure to prevent the war from happening, and perhaps the MSM and the west's *acting* as if Russia was bluffing, might have been a knowledge failure and communication failure on the part of MSM and some western leaders and Ukrainians, but it was *not* a knowledge failure or communication failure of the Biden Administration in the weeks ahead of the invasion - he said "Russia is going to do it" and "Russia don't do it" at the same time. And btw, the US is not omnipotent and Putin chose the war.
It is also interesting that people are so stuck in their narratives and expectations of what certain actors do and do not do, that, nobody ever asks - "Why did Trump and Putin not use their personal regard for each other for something other than a personal purpose, and use it to strengthen great power peace, via perhaps a Ukrainian neutrality deal, a Caucasus neutrality deal, and/or revival and strengthening of the START treaty and nuclear arms control?"
Just reading that question makes it sound like the questioner must be from an alternate universe.
Maybe something happened that forced Putin's hand during Biden's term? Trump can't be held liable for that.
If there *was*, a *something* forcing Putin's hand - we haven't discussed any specifics. Ukraine's train to NATO station was going nowhere fast. Zelensky was elected very much to focus on domestic reform without much foreign policy focus or public mandate to get overexcited about getting into NATO soon. Now, like nearly all Ukrainian politicians, he's obligated to take the position that Ukraine rightly owns all its pre-2014 territory, and nobody can make it promise to *not* join any alliance. But that does not mean any forward movement. And when does the EU let *anyone* in fast, and deliver well on its promises?
So what was forcing Putin's hand in Biden's term, other than an imperative on his part to change the Ukrainian status quo in his favor and possibly seeing the status quo become more entrenched, and more difficult to attack?
We don't know. Funny that part's left out.