Unfortunately, most administrations oversell the likely impact of sanctions when they roll them out, so the narrative develops that they are useless. Thanks for helping to reset expectations.
Well said! While reading this post, I had three questions ( along the same lines ) which I feel have been left out of discourse regarding economic sanctions in general, that I was quite curious about:
1. When we look at the questions “why haven’t sanctions knocked Russia out of Ukraine?” or even when considering why sanctioning great powers is less likely to work, in certain scenarios, are the possible extreme ideological preferences of the targeted actors considered?
2. If the sanctioning country imposes sanctions on a targeted actor, with the objective to coerce them into a certain action, do they assume rational responses of the targeted actor?
3. If the West portrays Putin as an angry, frustrated, war-driven, “Vlad the Mad” actor, then would that perception or portrayal have any impact on the level or type of sanctions imposed on Russia?
Thank you for the article, and your thoughts on these questions would be really appreciated!
Somewhat of a side note, but where are people getting the idea that Putin has suffered any kind of strategic defeat? Sure, he lost the opening battles. But he's on track to win the war.
Yes, the war blew up Russia's relationship with Europe (at least officially; I wonder how much off-the-books sanction-busting is going on in, say, luxury goods and how long Europe will stick to the official sanctions). But he's strengthening relationships with Brazil, India, Iran, and China. He's likely going to take a large chunk of Ukraine in the final peace deal, including valuable grain and shale gas regions. Potential sources of resistance are being ground down while the Russian industrial base is restarting its war footing.
A peace deal will leave Ukraine too weak to resist Russia on its own and I highly doubt NATO will admit a manpower-drained, drone-battered Ukraine. So while it will certainly come at an astronomically high cost, it's not clear to me at all that Putin is going to "lose" in the long run.
Unfortunately, most administrations oversell the likely impact of sanctions when they roll them out, so the narrative develops that they are useless. Thanks for helping to reset expectations.
Well said! While reading this post, I had three questions ( along the same lines ) which I feel have been left out of discourse regarding economic sanctions in general, that I was quite curious about:
1. When we look at the questions “why haven’t sanctions knocked Russia out of Ukraine?” or even when considering why sanctioning great powers is less likely to work, in certain scenarios, are the possible extreme ideological preferences of the targeted actors considered?
2. If the sanctioning country imposes sanctions on a targeted actor, with the objective to coerce them into a certain action, do they assume rational responses of the targeted actor?
3. If the West portrays Putin as an angry, frustrated, war-driven, “Vlad the Mad” actor, then would that perception or portrayal have any impact on the level or type of sanctions imposed on Russia?
Thank you for the article, and your thoughts on these questions would be really appreciated!
Somewhat of a side note, but where are people getting the idea that Putin has suffered any kind of strategic defeat? Sure, he lost the opening battles. But he's on track to win the war.
Yes, the war blew up Russia's relationship with Europe (at least officially; I wonder how much off-the-books sanction-busting is going on in, say, luxury goods and how long Europe will stick to the official sanctions). But he's strengthening relationships with Brazil, India, Iran, and China. He's likely going to take a large chunk of Ukraine in the final peace deal, including valuable grain and shale gas regions. Potential sources of resistance are being ground down while the Russian industrial base is restarting its war footing.
A peace deal will leave Ukraine too weak to resist Russia on its own and I highly doubt NATO will admit a manpower-drained, drone-battered Ukraine. So while it will certainly come at an astronomically high cost, it's not clear to me at all that Putin is going to "lose" in the long run.
The bombing of Germany did not knock it out of WW2. It took boots on the ground.
It took two atomic bombs to knock Japan out of WW2.
Sanctions aint got that power.
This is our second rodeo. The Kennan Letter tells of that first rodeo: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm
I think our second rodeo should follow that plan.
Well said. The questions we ask are so important to getting to the right answers. Thank you for reframing the debate in this way.