If I’ve learned one thing this century, it’s that Bad Things Are Bad, and that those in charge are generally blamed. I think we all misunderstood this year’s elections and events as being driven primarily by local factors, when really the whole world is mad about a shitty four years— about the pandemic, the strife it caused, the disorder it brought and the inflation it triggered. And Prof. Drezner is right, nobody’s been immune. And to give my hobbyhorse a good rocking, this is why the narrative of Trump triumph, Dem collapse is wrong and pernicious. We’ve had so many insanely close elections that a merely extremely close election looks like a blowout.
Is it simple economics? The wealth and income concentration in the United States isn’t unique to the United States, and if Piketty’s work is any indication the mechanism pushing more and more return to the wealthy isn’t either (provided I understand this correctly).
Is this just the age old tale of the rich taking and taking and taking till the population rises up and takes it back, again? Are we closing in on that breaking point, for the first time, in a world with an interconnected economy making it a world wide phenomena, rather than a localized one?
I think it's pretty clear at this point that, you're basically right, not only democracies, but governments, and that includes entrenched regimes, are struggling. All over the world ruling parties, left or right, are losing at the polls or at least seeing diminished majorities.
In my professional neck of the woods in Africa, the ANC lost its majority, Botswana's BDP was nearly wiped out after ruling since independence, Senegal and Ghana had changes at the ballot box. Moz didn't but is seeing the most sustained response to dodgy elections since Dhlakama died.
I think that ultimately, the post-COVID recovery has been uneven and disconcerting and ruling parties are paying the price, even where they have much better results than elsewhere like the U.S. What are the exceptions right now? Mexico?
Absolutely obvious and yet brilliant at the same time. As someone who has a soft spot for democracy, this was relieving - until the thought of mutual mass destruction entered my thoughts. Now, I'll be hiding in my closet with the lights turned off.
Perhaps I'm missing something... but saying that both democracies AND autocracies are feeling increased popular pressures and seeing greater instability isn't a theory for why this is happening. The only global variable that I see named here is inflation and I don't think that you're saying that inflation is the primary cause of this instability. If it's bad policy-making (for autocracies) then that would include bad policy-making for democracies as well presumably. I certainly agree with that, if that's indeed what you're saying. Why are all of these governments suddenly pursuing unusually bad policies? That's an interesting question.
I think there's a confluence of strains: declining birth rates in many countries, increased migration, new norms needed for social media/tech, AI, boomer generation fading, cllimate change, adjusting to the inclusion of more countries into the global economy, etc.
Great column, DD. Thanks especially for the gift-link to the full FT article on incumbent regime stability. I've been touting that point ever since Claudia Sahm first republished the FT graph and annotated it. (Even pinned the table to my Bluesky page.)
Also, I'd add Modi in India to the list of incumbents who took a hit this year. IIRC, his nationalist party suffered election setbacks this year.
It's fascinating, too note intra-continental upheaval elsewhere: Bolsonaro was thrown out in Brazil for DaSilva, and RIGHT NEXT DOOR, the Argentines ousted the center-left and installed RW-ish Milei; Italy threw out its centrists and put in the right, but Poland threw out its Orban wannabe and replaced him with a centrist.
In short, the pandemic and its aftermath have been a perilous year for incumbents almost anywhere you look.
Daniel W. Drezner: Concise and informative, especially incisive here:
"North Korea has already sent so many conventional weapons and ammunition to Russia “it cannot fight a war in Korea right now even if it wanted to,” said Doo Jin-ho, a senior analyst at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses in Seoul. “That may be Kim Jong-un’s biggest vulnerability now.”
"Russia is also facing difficulties because of its invasion of Ukraine. While there are questions of how long Ukraine can hold out, I have heard similar musings about Russia. As the war looks approaches its fourth year, cracks in the Russian economy are triggering some loud elite bickering. Last month the Economist warned that the Russian economy was in a bad way. Earlier this month the New York Times’ Anatoly Kurmanaev reported that, “The wartime economy that Russia spurred into overdrive is slowing, causing tensions among the country’s economic elites as the war with Ukraine approaches its fourth year…. The combination of rising prices and falling economic activity has led some economists and officials to warn that the Russian economy is moving toward stagflation, a quagmire where prices rise quickly without growth.”
Yes. Fractionalization/fragmentation are systemic processes, not unit-level processes.
So why is everything happening everywhere, all at once?
"Robust but fragile" = robust to shocks in the periphery... BUT FRAGILE to shocks in the core.
"Which means that 2025 might be an even more unstable year than 2024."
And just the team to lead the US amidst growing international instability: tRump and MAGA.
Can it get any worse? Well, you ain't seen nuthin' yet!
Yes, but it can also get better.
The Biden team set a very low bar in terms of both competence and integrity.
And better or worse, when Trump is president, we will know who is leading the country.
Two things that must always be borne in mind when comparing democracies and autocracies.
The faults of democracies are easier to see, and the faults of autocracies are kept better hidden.
The Soviet Union’s fall came as a shock to observers in 1991. I wonder who will shock us in 2025?
If I’ve learned one thing this century, it’s that Bad Things Are Bad, and that those in charge are generally blamed. I think we all misunderstood this year’s elections and events as being driven primarily by local factors, when really the whole world is mad about a shitty four years— about the pandemic, the strife it caused, the disorder it brought and the inflation it triggered. And Prof. Drezner is right, nobody’s been immune. And to give my hobbyhorse a good rocking, this is why the narrative of Trump triumph, Dem collapse is wrong and pernicious. We’ve had so many insanely close elections that a merely extremely close election looks like a blowout.
Is it simple economics? The wealth and income concentration in the United States isn’t unique to the United States, and if Piketty’s work is any indication the mechanism pushing more and more return to the wealthy isn’t either (provided I understand this correctly).
Is this just the age old tale of the rich taking and taking and taking till the population rises up and takes it back, again? Are we closing in on that breaking point, for the first time, in a world with an interconnected economy making it a world wide phenomena, rather than a localized one?
I think it's pretty clear at this point that, you're basically right, not only democracies, but governments, and that includes entrenched regimes, are struggling. All over the world ruling parties, left or right, are losing at the polls or at least seeing diminished majorities.
In my professional neck of the woods in Africa, the ANC lost its majority, Botswana's BDP was nearly wiped out after ruling since independence, Senegal and Ghana had changes at the ballot box. Moz didn't but is seeing the most sustained response to dodgy elections since Dhlakama died.
I think that ultimately, the post-COVID recovery has been uneven and disconcerting and ruling parties are paying the price, even where they have much better results than elsewhere like the U.S. What are the exceptions right now? Mexico?
Absolutely obvious and yet brilliant at the same time. As someone who has a soft spot for democracy, this was relieving - until the thought of mutual mass destruction entered my thoughts. Now, I'll be hiding in my closet with the lights turned off.
Perhaps I'm missing something... but saying that both democracies AND autocracies are feeling increased popular pressures and seeing greater instability isn't a theory for why this is happening. The only global variable that I see named here is inflation and I don't think that you're saying that inflation is the primary cause of this instability. If it's bad policy-making (for autocracies) then that would include bad policy-making for democracies as well presumably. I certainly agree with that, if that's indeed what you're saying. Why are all of these governments suddenly pursuing unusually bad policies? That's an interesting question.
And don't forget that the military junta in Myanmar is struggling to defeat a pro-democracy insurgency.
I think there's a confluence of strains: declining birth rates in many countries, increased migration, new norms needed for social media/tech, AI, boomer generation fading, cllimate change, adjusting to the inclusion of more countries into the global economy, etc.
December was OK for democracy. November, not so much
Great column, DD. Thanks especially for the gift-link to the full FT article on incumbent regime stability. I've been touting that point ever since Claudia Sahm first republished the FT graph and annotated it. (Even pinned the table to my Bluesky page.)
Also, I'd add Modi in India to the list of incumbents who took a hit this year. IIRC, his nationalist party suffered election setbacks this year.
It's fascinating, too note intra-continental upheaval elsewhere: Bolsonaro was thrown out in Brazil for DaSilva, and RIGHT NEXT DOOR, the Argentines ousted the center-left and installed RW-ish Milei; Italy threw out its centrists and put in the right, but Poland threw out its Orban wannabe and replaced him with a centrist.
In short, the pandemic and its aftermath have been a perilous year for incumbents almost anywhere you look.
Daniel W. Drezner: Concise and informative, especially incisive here:
"North Korea has already sent so many conventional weapons and ammunition to Russia “it cannot fight a war in Korea right now even if it wanted to,” said Doo Jin-ho, a senior analyst at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses in Seoul. “That may be Kim Jong-un’s biggest vulnerability now.”
"Russia is also facing difficulties because of its invasion of Ukraine. While there are questions of how long Ukraine can hold out, I have heard similar musings about Russia. As the war looks approaches its fourth year, cracks in the Russian economy are triggering some loud elite bickering. Last month the Economist warned that the Russian economy was in a bad way. Earlier this month the New York Times’ Anatoly Kurmanaev reported that, “The wartime economy that Russia spurred into overdrive is slowing, causing tensions among the country’s economic elites as the war with Ukraine approaches its fourth year…. The combination of rising prices and falling economic activity has led some economists and officials to warn that the Russian economy is moving toward stagflation, a quagmire where prices rise quickly without growth.”
Very helpful and astute analysis of the global instability every regime is facing! Thank you and Happy Holidays
... and Romania, which is in its way an even weirder case...