What I Got Wrong in 2025

Time for an end-of-the-year audit!

Photo by 愚木混株 Yumu on Unsplash

2025 was an extremely turbulent year in the world; a lot of previously fixed-and-frozen relations were cast asunder. As a commentator, such a massive injection of uncertainty into the state of the world offers both opportunity and risk. It is precisely during moments of uncertainty that folks might seek out the hard-working staff here at Drezner’s World to offer some insight, or even some predictions, about what is happening in the world.

The risk, of course, is predictions can be falsified over the course of time.

In the main, the hard-working staff here at Drezner’s World feels pretty good about the prognostications that I made about 2025. In the summer of 2024 I wrote a Politico essay that projected what the world would look like if there was a Trump second term: trade wars, severe transatlantic distress, and military adventurism in Latin America. Unfortunately, those predictions have held up well. Similarly, my Foreign Affairs essay that ran a few days after Trump won predicted two big things: the end of American exceptionalism and the corruption of American foreign policy. Unfortunately, those predictions have held up damn well.

So does this mean I did not get some stuff wrong? Good God no! I mean, I wasn’t Niall Ferguson-levels of wrong — but I definitely took some swings and I whiffed big time in some of my 2025 predictions. Which is the point of this particular newsletter. Because failing to admit that I was wrong would be even more wrong!

So, in no particular order, here are five things I posited during 2025 that proved to be patently wrong:

First, I thought the Trump administration would not bomb Iran. Hell, I wrote an entire post about it! I literally wrote the words, “Trump is not gonna bomb Iran. This is a bluff.” Boy was this wrong, as Trump definitely opted for bombing Iran. Here I’ll confess that the T.A.C.O. principle — Trump Always Chickens Out — seemed more compelling than it should have been. In retrospect, both the Netanyahu government and his own more hawkish advisors were able to persuade Trump that the risk of a quagmire was small. I strongly suspect that risk remains high — but the point here is that I was sure Trump would not bomb Iran and then he did that very thing.

Second, I should acknowledge that Trump’s myriad tariffs did not prove to be as economically catastrophic as I expected. To be clear, I was not a fan of the tariffs, and remain not a fan of them. The data shows that the tariffs have undeniably hurt the U.S. economy, reducing economic efficiency while driving up prices. And they are not popular, like, at all. But particularly after the Liberation Day nonsense, I was expecting more immediate and severe global effects, and that has just not happened — though the worst may be yet to come.

Third, Elbridge Colby’s influence over U.S. foreign policy and grand strategy wound up being more circumscribed than I expected. Back in July I wrote about Colby, the undersecretary of defense for policy and number three position at the Defense Department, suggesting that, “Colby does seem to wield outsized authority over national security policy…. the reason he wields it is due to the enabling empty shirts who are Trump and Hegseth.”

If this was actually true, however, then U.S. foreign policy should have become extremely hawkish towards China — as the Wall Street Journal noted, “Colby is known as a ‘prioritizer’ who favors limiting U.S. obligations outside Asia to free up resources to counter Beijing.” This past month has highlighted how this administration has failed to counter Beijing in either word or deed. For words, even a casual glance at the recent National Security Strategy reveals the lack of emphasis on China as a strategic threat. As for deeds, the U.S. has apparently agreed to let Nvidia sell top-of-the-line semiconductor chips to Beijing. Whatever one thinks of that move, there is no way that it was Bridge Colby’s idea.

Fourth, Democrats did not pay a big political price for caving on the government shutdown. When moderate Senate Democrats cut a deal on re-opening the government, I was… let’s say “less than impressed” with the how the Democrats handled the situation “As political strategy, I think this is malpractice.” I was not alone, as I approvingly quoted Nate Silver’s take: “As political strategy, I think this is malpractice.” But as it turns out Josh Marshall’s more optimistic take proved to be correct. Democrats continue to retain a healthy margin in the generic party ballot, and this did not really shrink after the government re-opened. The proof of this will come in the midterms I suppose, but by November of 2026 I doubt that memories of what happened in November 2025 will be politically significant.

Finally, the Boston Red Sox decision to trade Rafael Devers was not proof of the team’s further enshittification. This might have been my most errant prediction. I believed that the trading away Boston’s best power hitter — and the last connection to the team’s last World Series title — to the San Francisco Giants was a powerful data point supporting the enshittification thesis. But credit where due, the Red Sox did surge in the standings following the trade, whereas the Giants crashed to earth. It also turns out that under Craig Breslow Boston has done a fantastic job developing their young talent, particularly their young pitching. This is a great way to stay competitive over the long run. The current hot stove league has gone pretty well for them too. If they can resign Alex Bregman, or replace him with Bo Bichette, their offseason would have to be considered to be worthy of a contending team.

On all of these things, I was wrong. Sorry, readers — I will try to do better next year! But the hard-working staff will continue to make predictions on the regular. After all, the risk of being proven wrong is the only way one can be proven right.